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One of the major issues highlighted at the February
2007 Symposium on Innovative State Health Care
Initiatives is recent state initiatives to increase access
to health care and contain costs through managed
care. Recently, Pennsylvania has capped the surplus
of non-profit health plans to improve access to health
care and contain costs, however, there are unintended
consequences of such actions and altemative policy
options exist. IThe Lewin Group, a health care policy
research and management consulting firm, analyzed
the capping of non-profit health plans' surplus by
the Pennsylvania Insurance Department (PID). This
article is a summary of that report.
Pennsylvania Ilouse Resolution 865 of 2004 directed
the ILegislative Budget and Finance Committee to
examine the Commonwealth's options with respect to
the regulation, oversight, and disposition ofthe reserves
and surpluses of health insurers in Pennsylvania,
specifically Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans. The
resolution directed the Committee to analyze pertinent
statutes, regulations, and other measures in effect that
regulate such surpluses with particular attention paid
to other states' laws and practices. It also requested
the Committee to focus on potential alternatives with
respect to the use of any excess capital surpluses to
reduce premiums or to delay or moderate premium
increases. IThe Committee then issued a competitive
request for proposals for assistance in fulfilling the
charge and awarded a contract to The Lewin Group.
Pennsylvania has four not-for-profit Blue Cross
and Blue Shield health plans (Pennsylvania Blue
plans): (1) Blue Cross of Northeastern Pennsylvania,
based in Wilkes-Barre; (2) Capital Blue Cross,
based in Ilarrisburg; (3) 1Highmark, headquartered in
Pittsburgh; and (4) Independence Blue Cross, based in
Philadelphia. Prior to the Lewin study, the public focus
on the Pennsylvania Blue plans' financial activities
had intensified. First. the Pennsylvania Blue plans, like
health insurers nationwide, began to experience large
increases in their earninos. Second, the softening of
the economy at the same timne that health care costs
swselled increased thc number of uninsured rcsidcnts in
Pennsylvsania and made it more diffticult for those wsith
insurance to afford it. Some stakeholders argued that
the Pennsylvania Blue plans should contribute portions
of their surpluses to help make health coverage more
affordable. In February 2005, the PID took action to
address these issues.
IL,, ey Quiiestion is
T-he ILewin Group report' examined several key
questions:
Why do health plans need surplus?
Is there a "right" amount of surplus for health
plans?
Ilow are plan surpluses generally regulated and
what has been the experience with the Pennsylvania
Blue plans?
What are the consequences of capping surplus and
what are the alternatives to doing so?
How hae other states approached the issue?
First, why do health plans need a surplus? Most
insurers contend, similar to the Pennsylvania Blue
plans, that an insurer needs an adequate margin of
safety to endure periods of adverse experience without
triggering any torm of regulatory intervention. Also,
many health plans target surplus levels to cushion
against a downturn in the underwriting cycle.2
Second, is there a "right" amount of plan surplus9 Or,
in other words, how much surplus is too much? An
adequate margin of safety is especially important for
Pennsylvania Blue plans because they are not eligible
to participate in the state guaranty fund which protects
consumers and health care providers if an insurer fails
to meet its obligations. Lacking access to this safety
net, Pennsylvania Blue plans must maintain larger
surpluses to account for unforeseen risks.
Thirdb, how are plan surpluses generally regulated and
what has been the experience with the Pennsylvania
Blues plans9 In the past. the PID, like its counterparts
in other states, focused on making surc that the
PcnnssyIsania Blues plans held sufficient, inimnum
resersves and surpluses to ensure against insolsvency.
Pennsylvsania joined most othcr states in enacting a
v ariation of the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners model health risk-based capital act,
sshich addressed the minimums needed to ensure
solsvency.
In addition to regulating surplus minimums, the PID also has statutory
authority to govern Pennsylvania Blue plans' social missions, though at
least one Pennsylvania Blue plan does not agree with the Department's
view of the charitable obligations of the Pennsylvania Blue plans.' States
have varied widely in their interpretations of "charitable and benevolent," a
phrase within many not-for-profit Blue plans' enabling legislation. Whereas
in Pennsylvania, the Pennsylvania Blues plans have traditionally served as
insurers of last resort, in some states, the Pennsylvania Blues plans have
operated like commercial insurers and generally have not been expected to
provide significant levels of community benefit. In fact, the precise nature
of the community benefit requirements stemming from this language has
been a subject of much litigation.4
Prior to 2005, a combination of statutory expectations and company
missions drove the Pennsylvania Blue plans' community benefit activities.
For example, recent lawxs forced the Pennsylvania Blues plans to bid to
participate in the C ommonwealth's Children's Health Insurance Program
(CHIlIP) and adultlasic programs, in addition to offering coverage
to individuals who meet specific criteria set out by the federal 1Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA). Nationwide,
only Pennsylvania and Michigan implemented IEAPXA's requirements by
designating their Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans as the sole carriers to
offer coverage which must be offered regardless of health status or pre-
existing conditions. In 2003., the Pennsylvania Blues plans also voluntarily
committed to participate in the federal Health Coverage Tax Credit (HCTC)
program created under the Trade Assistance Act.
Additionally, the Pennsylvania Blues plans' role as insurer of last resort
has led the plans to offler subsidized coverage to any individual regardless
of health status, even if the individual is not eligible under HIPA (this is
termed "guarantee issue coverage"). In contrast, insurers in most other
states may decline to issue policies to individuals with serious health
conditions, or may charge extremely high rates. Thus, Pennsylvania Blues
plans -given Pennsylvania's statutory requirements in adultBasic, CHIP,
HIPAA, as well as the Pennsylvania Blues plans' voluntary commitment
to HCTC, subsidized guarantee issue coverage in the individual market,
and direct charitable giving programs-are allocating percentage amounts
of community benefit funding that are at least as generous as, if not more
generous than, the amounts allocated by their counterparts elsewhere.
What has the PID done to regulate the Pennsylvania Blue plans' surpluses?
In 2004, the PID asked the Pennsylv ania Blues plans tojustify their surpluses
and explain how the plans contribute to their communities. In February 2005,
the PID released two key documents. Ihe first document, a Determination
and Order, outlined acceptable ranges flor the Blue plans' level of surplus
capital -efficient, sufficient, or inefficient. This document reported that
none of the plans held excess capital and declared that any Blue plan having
"sufficient" capital- three of the four plans stood in this category (at the
time) N-would not be allowed to include "risk and contingency factors" in its
future rate requests.6 Risk and contingency factors are margins that insurers
build into rates to cover unforeseen events and fluctuations in medical claims.
In the past, the PID has permitted up to a 5 percent risk and contingency
factor in addition to projected medical claims and administrative costs for
Blue plans and a factor of 5 percent or more flor commercial insurers. The
second issuance, "Agreement on Community IHealth Reinvestment,' was
executed by the Deputy Insurance Commissioner and the heads of the
four Pennsylvania Blue plans and set forth a program in which the Blues
plans, for the years 2005-2010, pledged more than one percent of their
premium revenues to community benefits. The aggregate value of the
pledges would total $950
million, although not all
of the funding was new.
Notably, the agreement
supplanted an order that x
had beeii in place since
1996 for Himghmarkr re
the largest of the plans
and likely source fom
more thiami half of fiture
comniunity health
reimivestmient dollars.
When the consolidation
of twNo predecessor entities for med Hmghniark in 1996, the Insurance
Cnninissioner ordered Highimrk, and Highmark alone, to allocate at
least 1.25 percent of direct xwrirten premiuni to social mission programs.
That order had no end date amid as of 2004, 1Highmark spent about $40-$50
million annually on community benefits. IHighmark projected 2004 outlay s
of $94 million-about double its fornial obligation under the 1996 order.
Whith the PID taking these txxn major steps to reoulate Pennsylvxania Blue
plan surpluses, one should consider the consequences of regulating plan
surpluses. Rigid caps on surpluses could undermine competition if not
managed prudently. The primary advantage of capping surplus levels is
that it may slow the rate of premium growth if an insurer has surplus capital
that is at or near its ceiling. However, an insurer mas react by draining
surplus in ways that do not involve rate relief, such as simply spending
more on staff and infrastructure improvements. Also, the plan could create
additional community benefit outlays, though this could conflict with an
insurer's interest in building market share and improving performance.
In addition to uncertain benefits, negative consequences may also result
from placing a numeric cap on insurers, surpluses, particularly if set at
a low level. First, the intervention could create market instability if it
resulted in artificially low premiums. Depending on the scale of the impact
on premium rates, some competitors might be forced to exit the market,
leaving consumers fewer choices. Second, the short-term savings could be
followed later by pricing increases. Lastly. when insurers have less capital,
insurers face lower credit ratings from independent rating agencies, forcing
the plans to pay higher interest costs whenever they need to borrow.
Given these consequences, what are the alternatives to capping surplus?
Traditionally, state insurance departments have attempted to influence
premium levels in a number of ways: underwriting and rate-making
rules, especially in the sInall-group and non-group segments; rate filing
and approval processes; and setting Ininimum medical loss ratios. These
regulations focus on insurers' abilities to generate earnings, rather than on
how much surplus can be kept once earned. Because these approaches affect
the rate-making process, they have a more direct and predictable impact on
premium affordability compared to capping surplus levels. Ilowever, any
type of rate regulation must consider carrier solvency and the importance of
regulating carriers on a level playing field. Further, any type of regulation
that interf eres excessisvely
w ith traditional market
forces and market
picing can base the
unintended conscquence
of forcing~ carricrs out of
the maiket.
An important component
of Thc Lcssin Group
rcport w5as to rev iesw
other states' approaches
in response to thcse
issues. Very fcsw states
hav c hosen to regulate
the upper bounds of surplus capital accunsulation. Until June 2006,
Haswaii capped surplus at the level at whlich a non-profit carrier's net xxorth
exceeded 50 percent of its aisnual health care expenditures and operating
expenditures as reported on the plais's most recent finaiscial statement filed
wxith the Commissioner.9 Altcrnatisvely. Michigan caps its risk based capital
ratio (RBC) at 1,000 pcrcent for Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan.9 i
comparison. Pennsylvania uses diftcrent RBC targct ranges for its four
Blue plans (550 pcrcent to 750 percent for its laroer plans. Righmark and
Some states have worked with large non-profit carriers to direct high
surpluses toward community benefit health care initiatives. As discussed. in
Pennsyvsania, the state formalized the prospective "community activities"
of its four Blues plans and the plans voluntarily agreed to commit $I_50
million annually to a six-year community health reinvestment program.
Until the creation of the Communits Health Reinvestment Agreement in
February 2005, only one other state, Maryland. had a formal requirement
for community benefit outlays that applied exclusively to a Blue plan. Since
then, Massachusetts has created formal cornmunity-benefit guidelines for
non-profit IIMOs in the state. This program included $85 million to support
basic health coverage for low-income and uninsured residents with the
remaining $65 million for other health care related community activities."
Most recently, CareFirst announced a $92 million initiative intended to
address community benefits with $60 million from a reduction in premiums
against anticipated 2005 levels. This was in response to increased public
scrutiny, especially by the Appleseed Foundation and hearings by the
D.C. Insurance C ommissioner on CareFirst BlueCross Blue Shield's D.C.
affiliate, Group Hospitalization and Medical Services, Inc.'s (GH MSI )
charitable obligation to the community." It is important to note that the
unintended consequence of imposing community benefit requirements
on non-profit carriers is that such requirements serve as an indirect tax on
carrier members who subsidize their community-benefit initiatives with
their premiums. Some members prefer reduced premiums instead of using
premium profits for these initiatives that serve the community as a whole.
Conclusion
There are a myriad of ways to regulate surpluses in order to increase access
to health care-each with its own intended and unintended consequences.
Focusing on increased transparency can improve competition and etficiency
and stronger regulatory authority and oversight can provide a first step in
addressing concerns of surplus accumulation. Targeting appropriate surplus
levels is critical for managing financial risk. It is even more important for
non-profit organizations which do not have access to equity markets and
must fund investments in new products and infrastructure out of operating
results' surplus or debt instruments. Surplus levels, which are held too low,
say expose the organization to risk of failure durusg predictablc pcriods
of downturns in the underwriting cycle. They also limit the organization's
ability to respond to changes in business conditions and demands for
new products. But surplus levels that are too high may affect product
affordability and could subject organizations to unwanted regulatory
scrutiny. Since most states do not impose maximum surplus levels, it is
incumbent on state insumance departments to ieviesw these issues in light ot
the circumstances and the critical considerations outlined above to increase
access to health care and contain costs.
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